


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**1975/10/23**



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MEMORANDUM



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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October 23, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT   
SUBJECT: Secretary's talks with Chinese Officials 


Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass to you the following report of his talks with Chinese Officials.

"On Wednesday, after sightseeing in the morning, a desultory hour and a quarter meeting with Teng Hsiao-ping in the afternoon, and our return banquet with mutually brief, bland toasts, we finally were given the Chinese reaction to our draft communique for your visit. They submitted their counterdraft which bears absolutely no resemblance to our version and is totally unacceptable. The full text is attached at the end of this cable.

The draft we gave them contained several common principles concerning the international situation: A half step forward on normalization confirming the principle of one China; and considerable progress in various fields of bilateral relations, such as trade, exchange, branch liaison offices, and a hot line. We expect them to whittle down the areas of agreement and insert some unacceptable language concerning international principles. What they have given us, however, constitutes not only no forward movement, but retrogression from the Shanghai communique. A document of this sort would be torn apart by our critics and confuse our friends. I believe it would be domestically and internationally impossible for you to come here to sign a document along the lines of their draft.

In addition to the unacceptability of their draft was the fact that they waited until the very last moment to give it to us. We gave them our version on Monday and they responded at 11:30 P.M. on the eve of my departure on Wednesday night. This gave us no time for meaningful exchange on the documents even though they knew their draft would be unacceptable to us, and we had forewarned them weeks in advance that we wished to essentially complete the drafting of the communique on my visit.

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
Therefore, I immediately called a meeting with the foreign minister Wednesday night to tell them that their communique, and the manner in which they presented it to us, was unacceptable, and that we expected them to come up with a more reasonable basis for your visit if we were to proceed. I emphasized that their approach was heavily over-weighted with contentious language and disagreements, and was very light on progress and common views. Such a document was in neither side's interest. In any event the American people would never understand why a U.S. president had traveled 8000 miles for such an outcome.

Chiao at first took a very firm line, saying that our draft was equally unacceptable to them. I covered up our differences in international affairs; represented only infinitesimal progress on Taiwan; and was unrealistically ambitious on bilateral agreements given the nature of our relationship. He at first said that we had to accept their draft or do without a communique. In any event they didn't think a communique was important and would be ready to dispense with one.

I made clear that there had to be a communique and that it could not look anything like theirs. After further exchanges, during which I questioned the purpose of your coming, Chiao swung around to the position that while they absolutely must maintain their structure, i.e. each side stating their different perspectives followed by areas of commonality, the actual wording and balance of the document was open to change. I emphasized that the great imbalance between differences and agreements in their draft had to be righted. We agreed that we would submit a counter-draft through Ambassador Bush early next week and meanwhile would hold the announcement of the dates of your visit in abeyance. I clearly foreshadowed what we will do to their document -- boil down the quantity and aggressiveness of their positions; add the U.S. viewpoints; and beef up the area of consensus and bilateral movement.

I have no illusions that we are in for anything but a tough process in order to get what at best will be a minimum communique. I believe we should use our counterdraft next week to determine whether they are willing to settle for something that will justify your trip. Despite inevitable public speculation, I don't believe we should announce the dates of your trip until we are clear on the basic outlines of the communique. At best there will still be some hard bargaining here during your visit. You may

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even be forced to consider postponing your trip if the Chinese do not improve the communique. We can decide this after seeing their response to our next draft.

Working in favor is the fact that it cannot be in the Chinese interest to have our relationship go publicly sour. This would only expose them further to the Soviet Union, about which they are genuinely concerned. They have continually made it clear, and repeated tonight, that you are welcome whether or not there is a meeting of the minds or communique. Working against us is their perception that our domestic weakness have us floundering and we are therefore less useful as a balance in the world; their own domestic pre-succession immobility; the fact that Teng doesn't have the scope or flexibility of Chou; their political and ideological constraints when we are at this stage of our bilateral relations; and their apparent failure to understand that we must show some concrete progress if we are to maintain domestic support for our China policy.


We will work on our counterdraft on the way home, and I look forward to discussing our strategy with you upon my return."

Begin Text:

Joint Communique: President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from December 1 through December 6, 1975. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Ford, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials.

During the visit, the leaders of China and the United States held a serious review of the turbulent international situation and expounded their respective positions and views. The two sides also had a frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and other subjects of common interest. The Chinese side stated: The current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven, and the situation is excellent. All the basic contradictions in the world are sharpening. The factors for revolution and war are both increasing. Countries want independence. Nations want liberation and the people want revolution -- this torrential tide of our time is rising ever higher. The peoples of the third world countries have won a series of significant victories in their struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism. The contention between the superpowers for world hegemony has become ever

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
more intense. There is no lasting peace in the world. There definitely does not exist an irreversible process of detente; instead, the danger of a new world war is mounting. This has been borne out ever more clearly by objective reality. The danger of war comes mainly from social-imperialism. People of all countries must get prepared against war. without preparation one will suffer. It is China's fundamental policy to dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony, and to persist in independence and self-reliance. As always, the Chinese government and people will firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries.

The U.S. side stated: Both the Chinese and U.S. sides reaffirmed the principles agreed upon in the Shanghai communique. They maintained that they should conduct the relations between China and the U.S. on the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. In particular, they stated that neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other part of the world and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

Both the Chinese and U.S. sides pointed out that since the Shanghai communique, there has been a growth in the exchanges and friendship between the two peoples and an improvement in the relations between the two countries. It conforms to the common desire of the peoples of China and the U.S. to realize the normalization of the relations between the two countries.

The Chinese side reaffirmed: The Taiwan issue is the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the U.S.: The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. And when and how the Chinese people liberate Taiwan is entirely China's internal affair in

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which no country has the right to interfere. The Chinese government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," an "independent Taiwan," or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." The Chinese side emphasized that the normalization of relations between China and the U.S. can be realized only when the U.S. government severs its so-called diplomatic relations with the Taiwan "regime," withdraws all U.S. armed forces and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan strait area, and abrogates the U.S.-Chiang "joint defense treaty."

The United States side stated: . . . .

The two sides agreed that the contacts and exchanges between the peoples of China and the United States in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism will contribute to the enhancement of mutual understanding and friendship. Both sides will facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges. Both sides maintained that it is in the interest of the two peoples to develop bilateral trade step by step on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The two sides agreed to continue to facilitate such trade. President Ford and his party expressed their appreciation to the government and people of the People's Republic of China for the hospitality extended to them.

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